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Financial Development and the Distribution of Income in 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
One of the central concerns in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been the 
reduction of poverty and inequality so prevalent in the continent. Using large world samples, 
the literature has found that financial development increases economic growth, increases the 
income of the poor, and reduces inequality. This paper studies the effects of financial 
development on the whole distribution of income in LAC. We find that the income of the 
poorest quintile has not been affected by expansion in the financial system. However, we do 
find that financial development has had a disproportionate positive effect on the incomes of 
the second, third and fourth quintiles. We also find some evidence for the Greenwood-
Jovanovic (1991) hypothesis that this positive effect only begins after a country crosses a 
certain economic development threshold. 
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 1 Introduction
Most Latin American governments have declared growth with equity to be their
overachieving goal; ￿nance is a key instrument￿ one that can assist them or un-
dermine them. Barbara Stallings and Rogerio Studart (2006).
Persistent income inequality and poverty have been fundamental issues of concern in
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To some degree, many political and economic
experiments in the last century have been driven by the search for a system that would reduce
inequality and poverty in the continent. These political and economic experiments include:
heavy government intervention and protectionism, followed by privatizations and market-
oriented reforms, followed recently in some countries by the undoing of market reforms and
nationalization of natural resources. Among the many reforms implemented in developing
countries in the last 30 years, the liberalization and expansion of ￿nancial markets has been
prominent. According to Edwards (1995), LAC countries practiced "￿nancial repression"
policies from the 1940s to the 1970s. There was a signi￿cant government presence among
the ￿nancial institutions with directed lending to chosen sectors and interest rate ceilings
with the purpose of raising investment and growth. With the in￿ uential work of McKinnon
(1973) and Shaw (1973), ￿nancial liberalization ensued starting in the mid 1970s. Financial
markets expanded steadily in LAC after that period.
The e⁄ects of ￿nancial development across the world have been extensively studied in the
academic literature with a general consensus that ￿nance increases economic growth (Levine,
2005). Some authors have also begun studying how ￿nancial development a⁄ects poverty
and inequality. Using data from a world-wide sample, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(2007) ￿nd that ￿nancial development disproportionately raises the income of the poorest
quintile and that it reduces income inequality. Similarly Li, Squire and Zou (1998) found
that ￿nancial development lowered inequality and raised the average income of the bottom
80th percentile of the population. A study by Dollar and Kraay (2002) ￿nds that changes in
￿nancial development only a⁄ect the income growth of the poor by raising average growth.
Honohan (2004) also ￿nds that ￿nancial depth is negatively associated with a headcount
measure of poverty.1
In this paper, we focus on the experience of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
We extend the literature in studying the e⁄ects of ￿nancial development on all income
quintiles￿ not just the poorest. Examining the e⁄ects for the whole range of income allows
1Other research on the topic includes Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2006) and Jalialian and Kirkpatrick (2002).
2us to better understand the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on overall inequality. Individuals
in di⁄erent income categories may have di⁄erent access or use of ￿nancial services. Contrary
to the world-sample results from the literature, we ￿nd that the income of the poorest quintile
in LAC countries was una⁄ected by ￿nancial development. This ￿nding has very important
policy implications since the poor do not seem to be bene￿tting from or accessing the growing
￿nancial system. On the positive side, we do ￿nd that the income of the second, third and
fourth quintiles disproportionately bene￿tted from ￿nancial expansion. Hence, ￿nance has
been successful in raising income in the middle ranges of the income distribution in LAC.
Theory does not o⁄er a clear-cut hypothesis of the e⁄ect of ￿nance on the income of
the poor. Given their lack of collateral and scant credit histories, poor entrepreneurs may
be the most a⁄ected by ￿nancial market imperfections such as information asymmetries,
contract enforcement costs, and transactions costs. As a result poor entrepreneurs with good
projects may receive little funding from ￿nancial markets and remain in poverty perpetuating
inequality in the country (Galor and Zeira, 1993). Increased ￿nancial development in the
country would serve to relax this funding constraint, particularly on the poor, and give them
more access to ￿nancing. Hence, ￿nancial development would reduce poverty and inequality
as well as increase growth due to the improved allocation of capital to productive projects.
Other theories (e.g., Bourginon and Verdier, 2000) propose that ￿nancial development
may not reduce poverty. These theories posit that the poor rely more on informal networks
for credit. Hence, ￿nancial development would only bene￿t the rich and raise inequality.
Along these lines, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) propose a non-linear e⁄ect of ￿nance on
inequality. At early stages of economic development, only the rich have access to the limited
￿nancial markets, so as the economy and the ￿nancial system grow, inequality rises. Once
higher levels of economic development are reached, larger segments of society can access
the growing ￿nancial markets, so inequality can be reduced. Consequently, there must be
some threshold level of economic development after which the incomes of poorer segments
increase with expansion of ￿nancial markets. Another reason why ￿nancial development may
not reduce poverty is that when liberalization is done rapidly crisis seem to follow. In the
LAC case, this was due generally to liberalization without adequate expansion of prudential
regulation and supervision. Resulting crisis would then increase unemployment and reduce
incomes across the board.
We test these theories using data for 21 LAC countries from 1960 to 2005. We use GMM
dynamic panel estimators from Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to
confront potential econometric pitfalls like country speci￿c e⁄ects, endogeneity and reverse
causation. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the measures of poverty,
inequality, and ￿nancial development. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses and methodology,
3then Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data Description
We use measures of poverty, inequality, and ￿nancial development that have been typically
used in the literature. The United Nations Wider database is the source for all income
distribution data. While the coverage extends back to 1960 in some cases, the data are
a compilation of various country-level surveys that were conducted at irregular intervals.
Hence, the income distribution data have gaps for various years especially prior to the 1990s.
First, we compute the average income of every quintile from the poorest (Q1) to the
richest (Q5). To obtain the average income of each quintile, we multiply the income share
reported by the Wider data base by the average per capita GDP and divide by 0.2. Table
1 shows the evolution of the average income by quintile in LAC in constant dollars. Income
of the poorest quintile (Q1) rose from the 1960s through the 1980s, but has declined since
then to about $1,165 in the 2000-2005 period. While this is the average for the continent,
there is of course signi￿cant variation among countries. The lowest average income for Q1 in
the 2000-05 period was $444 in Guatemala and the highest was $2,578 in Uruguay. Average
incomes for quintiles Q2 and Q3 show a similar pattern to Q1 since they rose from the 1960s
through the 1980s and then declined in the 1990s and 2000-05. Conversely, incomes for Q4
and Q5 (the richest) have risen in 2000-05 with respect to their 1990s averages. The average
income of the rich (Q5) in the continent was $19,777 in 2000-05 as Table 1 shows. The
highest average income for the Q5 group is found in Chile at about $37,000 and the lowest
is found in Bolivia at about $8,500.
Table 1
Income Distribution, Financial Development and Growth in LAC countries
Variable 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-05
Income Q1 1,106 1,496 1,538 1,223 1,165
Income Q2 1,991 2,724 3,119 2,600 2,516
Income Q3 2,916 4,302 4,996 4,230 4,076
Income Q4 4,413 6,582 7,995 6,516 6,682
Income Q5 11,196 16,380 18,981 17,109 19,777
Gini 47.76 47.49 47.57 50.70 52.93
Private Credit 14.56 20.72 26.08 27.37 34.73
Per capita growth 2.299 2.309 -0.470 1.124 0.856
4A second variable of interest is the Gini coe¢ cient which is a commonly used measure
of inequality.2 According to Table 1, the Gini declined slightly from the 1960s to the 1980s,
then rose in the 1990s and 2000-05. Inequality in LAC has risen in the last 15 years. In our
most recent period 2000-05, the highest inequality levels are found in Brazil (Gini = 61.2)
and the lowest in Jamaica (38.6).
Third, we measure the degree of ￿nancial development in a country using the Private
Credit variable. This variable is de￿ned as the amount of credit issued by ￿nancial interme-
diaries to the private sector. Private Credit is the most commonly used measure of ￿nancial
development in the literature (Levine, 2005). It accounts for credit issued by bank and
non-bank ￿nancial institutions, but excludes credit issued by central banks and development
banks. Since it measures credit issued by all ￿nancial institutions (banks and non-banks), it
should also capture credit issued by micro￿nance institutions which are quite important for
lower income households.3 As Table 1 shows, Private Credit rose from about 15% of GDP in
the 1960s to about 35% of GDP in 2000-2005. Hence, there has been a signi￿cant expansion
in the ￿nancial system in Latin America. Financial repression policies were practiced from
the 1940s through the 1970s and consisted of heavy government participation in ￿nancial
markets; interest rate ceilings; barriers to the establishment of new ￿nancial institutions;
and credit directed to particular sectors of the economy that were deemed important by
government planners (Edwards, 1995). The basis for these polices was the belief that they
would encourage investment and growth. By the 1970s the work of McKinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) became in￿ uential in promoting ￿nancial liberalization to promote growth. The
e⁄ects can be seen in the Private Credit data that shows a steady increase starting in the
1970s.
To gain further perspective of the evolution of ￿nancial markets and of the inequality
variables, it is useful to compare with East Asian countries which had a similar income per
capita to LAC in the 1960s. Figure 1 depicts this comparison. While Private Credit in East
Asia was comparable to LAC in 1965-1975, it increased by much more by 1995-2005 to over
70% of GDP. That means that ￿nancial development in East Asia is now about twice that
of Latin America and the Caribbean. Regarding the Gini coe¢ cient comparison, inequality
in LAC increased, while it decreased in East Asia and it is now lower than in LAC. The data
on the income of the poorest (Q1) tell of an even more dramatic comparison. The average
2The Gini coe¢ cient is de￿ned as a ratio. The numerator is the area between the Lorenz curve of the
distribution and the uniform (perfect) distribution line. The denominator is the area under the uniform
distribution line. Expressed as a percentage, the Gini coe¢ cient ranges from 0 (perfect equality) to 1
(extreme inequality). Hence, higher values mean more inequality.
3Unfortunately, informal loans are not captured by Private Credit, but clearly they can be an important
source of ￿nancing for the poor.





























LAC East Asi a





















LAC East Asi a
































LAC East Asi a


























LAC East Asi a



























LAC East Asi a


























LAC East Asi a































LAC East Asi a
65-75 95-05 65-75 95-05
income of Q1 was lower in East Asia in 1965-1975, but has since increased signi￿cantly to
around $2500. Conversely in LAC, the average income of Q1 has decreased to around $1,200.
The average income of the remaining quintiles show a similar pattern: stagnation or small
increases in LAC and large increases in East Asia.
While average incomes of all quintiles in LAC have experienced modest increases (com-
pared to East Asia), it is our task to try to establish if changes in these incomes were to
any degree driven by the expansion of the ￿nancial system after accounting for the e⁄ects
of other variables that may a⁄ect incomes and inequality. We will analyze in particular if
the growth rates of income and inequality variables were a⁄ected by ￿nancial development
as. Data for the period 1960 to 2000 are used when available. Our units of observation are
￿ve-year non-overlapping averages of the variables as typically done in the growth literature.
Five-year averages are used in this literature to smooth out the e⁄ects of short run ￿ uctu-
ations and focus on the long-run growth trend. While we are primarily interested in the
6long-run e⁄ects of ￿nancial development, the e⁄ects of rapid credit expansions that yielded
banking or ￿nancial crisis are not entirely averaged out. Following Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine￿ s (2006) approach, we compute yearly growth rates of average income for Quintile 1
through 5. We also compute the yearly growth rate in the Gini coe¢ cient. Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the regression analysis.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Private Credit 102 0.2808 0.1652 0.0428 1.0136
Growth of Income Q1 78 0.0003 0.0622 -0.1781 0.1810
Growth of Income Q2 74 0.0067 0.0493 -0.1526 0.1874
Growth of Income Q3 74 0.0101 0.0341 -0.0968 0.1654
Growth of Income Q4 74 0.0110 0.0298 -0.1056 0.1172
Growth of Income Q5 76 0.0142 0.0246 -0.0681 0.0833
Growth of Gini 108 0.0011 0.0261 -0.1218 0.0741
Growth of GDP 108 0.0119 0.0213 -0.0615 0.0567
Average Years of schooling 106 5.1450 1.4938 1.7800 8.9100
Log In￿ ation 107 2.8080 1.5401 -0.7208 7.4189
Openness 108 55.8477 41.8263 7.2420 190.9640
According to Table 2, the growth of income of the poor (Q1) was a very low 0.03% per
year. In general, the income of higher quintiles grew faster at about 1% per year. Also, the
Gini coe¢ cient increased on average by 0.11% per year, so inequality increased on average.
The list of countries is provided in the Appendix.
3 Hypothesis and Methodology
We follow the basic regression speci￿cation from the growth literature:
yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)yi;t￿1 + ￿1FDi;t + ￿Xi;t + ￿i + "i;t: (1)
This is the typical representation for dynamic panel estimation. In this equation, yi;t rep-
resents, alternatively, the logarithm of the average income for each quintile and the Gini
coe¢ cient. Hence, yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1 is the growth rate in income for the relevant quintile or the
7growth rate of the Gini coe¢ cient. The ￿rst explanatory variable is the lagged value of the
dependent variable, yi;t￿1, which introduces a dynamic speci￿cation. The level of ￿nancial
development, FDi;t, is the key explanatory variable that we are interested in. The hypoth-
esis to be tested is whether ￿1 is positive and signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. The vector
Xi;t includes a number of control variables. We are guided by the controls variables used
in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007). These variables are: the growth rate of GDP
per capita (as in Dollar and Kraay, 2002), the average number of years of schooling in the
population (a proxy for the stock of human capital in the population), the in￿ ation rate (an
indicator of the macroeconomic environment), and the openness of the economy (computed
as exports plus imports as a share of GDP). Financial development may also a⁄ect income of
a particular quintile by its e⁄ect on overall GDP per capita. Hence, it is important to control
for GDP per capita to establish if there is a disproportionate e⁄ect of ￿nancial development
on the income of a particular quintile (beyond its e⁄ect on GDP per capita). Finally, ￿i
captures unobserved country-speci￿c e⁄ects.
As described in the introduction, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) propose a hypothesis
of a non-linear e⁄ect between ￿nancial development and inequality. In early stages of devel-
opment, ￿nancial development may raise inequality as only the rich bene￿t. In later stages,
the poor may also bene￿t so further ￿nancial development reduces inequality. To test this
hypothesis we examine several thresholds levels in per capita GDP which we place alterna-
tively at the 10th, 20th, 30th,...,90th percentiles of GDP per capita as in Rioja and Valev
(2004). We create a dummy variable DUM which equals 1 when GDP per capita is above
the threshold. Then we interact this variable with ￿nancial development. The regression
equation then becomes:
yi;t ￿ yi;t￿1 = (￿ ￿ 1)yi;t￿1 + ￿1FDi;t + ￿2(DUM ￿ FDi;t) + ￿Xi;t + "i;t: (2)
Greenwood and Jovanovic￿ s (1990) hypothesis would imply that ￿1 < 0, but that ￿1+￿2 > 0:
As we do not know where the threshold lies exactly, we estimate equation 2 repeatedly
varying the threshold as described above. In addition, this hypothesis has only been partly
tested in the literature examining the relationship between the Gini coe¢ cient and ￿nancial
development. Since Greenwood and Jovanovic￿ s (1990) hypothesis has implications for the
overall inequality measure, it should also apply to the various income levels that make up
the inequality measure. Hence, we test their hypothesis for all quintiles as well as for the
Gini.
As it is well known, there are concerns of reverse causation and endogeneity in estimating
equations like (1) and (2). First, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable could bias the
8coe¢ cients estimates. Also, there is the distinct possibility of reverse causation from quintile
incomes to the real GDP per capita and other explanatory variables. To confront these
problems, dynamic panel estimators developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell
and Bond (1998) have been used in the growth literature in recent years. These GMM
systems estimators have become well known (see Greene, 2008), hence we will only describe
them brie￿ y here. Internal instruments are used to address the potential endogeneity. The
GMM systems estimator is a stacked estimator in di⁄erences and levels. The di⁄erences
equations use lagged levels as instruments. The level equations use lagged di⁄erences as
instruments. There are two speci￿cation tests for this methodology. First, the Hansen J test
establishes if the instruments used are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error terms). Second,
the AR(2) test establishes whether there is second-order serial correlation in the errors. If
both of these tests are satis￿ed, then the coe¢ cient estimates are consistent.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the benchmark results for the estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values which
are in parenthesis. The income of the poorest quintile, Q1, is the dependent variable for the
￿rst column of results. Private Credit does not have a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on the
income of the poor in LAC. Furthermore, even the growth in per capita GDP had no e⁄ect on
the income of the poor in LAC since its coe¢ cient is also not signi￿cant. Conversely, Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2007) ￿nd that ￿nancial development had a disproportionate
e⁄ect on the income of the poor using a world sample. Unfortunately for the poor in LAC,
we ￿nd no e⁄ect. Clearly, this result needs more discussion and elaboration which we do
later in the paper. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on initial income is negative and statistically
signi￿cant. In our setting the intepretation is that countries with the relatively low income
of Q1 experienced subsequent higher growth in the income of Q1. This is akin to the
convergence e⁄ect of the Solow growth model.
The average income of the second poorest quintile, Q2, is the dependent variable for
the regression shown in the second column of Table 3. Private Credit has had a positive
and statistically signi￿cant (at the 1% level) e⁄ect on the income of Q2. Furthermore, the
coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is 1.247, and it is also statistically signi￿cant. An additional
t-test (not reported on Table 3) reveals that we cannot reject that this coe¢ cient is di⁄erent
from 1. This implies that GDP per capita increases have raised the average income of Q2
one-for-one. Consequently, the positive signi￿cant coe¢ cient on Private Credit indicates
that Private Credit has had a disproportionate positive e⁄ect on the income of this quintile.
Hence, while the expansion of ￿nancial markets has not helped the poorest of the poor, it
9has helped the lower-middle income group (Q2).4
Table 3
The E⁄ect of Financial Development on the Distribution of Income and
Inequality
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Gini
Private Credit -0.102 0.101 0.058 0.050 -0.059 0.102
(0.805) (0.003) (0.096) (0.041) (0.392) (0.059)
Growth of GDP per cap. -0.614 1.247 1.338 1.467 0.723 -0.013
(0.792) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.955)
Initial Level of Income -0.362 -0.059 -0.020 0.005 0.012
(0.000) (0.177) (0.426) (0.837) (0.433)
Initial Gini -0.005
(0.000)
Constant 3.645 0.390 0.136 -0.070 -0.103 0.138
(0.085) (0.290) (0.526) (0.750) (0.479) (0.187)
Obs 75 71 71 71 73 102
AR(2) test p-value 0.323 0.432 0.293 0.409 0.351 0.604
Hansen J test p-value 0.431 0.745 0.749 0.185 0.312 0.298
Note: p-values in parenthesis correspond to robust standard errors as in Windmeijer (2005)
It is further important to interpret the size of the 0.101 coe¢ cient on Private Credit
for the Q2 regression to establish its economic signi￿cance. The country of Guatemala, for
example, had the fourth smallest ￿nancial sector among the countries in our sample in 1995-
2000; Private Credit was about 0.18 or 18% of GDP. If Guatemala expanded its ￿nancial
markets to the median level of 0.26 (Dominican Republic), this would yield a rise in the
income of Q2 of 0.8% per year (0:101 ￿ (0:26 ￿ 0:18)): This is a sizable e⁄ect, although an
expansion in the ￿nancial sector of 8% of GDP would have to be undertaken slowly over a
couple of years and accompanied by adequate supervision.
Regarding the e⁄ects of ￿nancial development on quintiles Q3 and Q4, Table 4 shows
that Private Credit has also had a disproportionate e⁄ect on the average income of these
middle and middle-high income quintiles. While the coe¢ cient estimate for Q3 is positive
but only signi￿cant at the 10% level, the coe¢ cient for Q4 is positive and signi￿cant at the
4The AR(2) test rejects the presence of second order autocorrelation. The Hansen J tests rejects that the
instruments are correlated with the errors.
105% level. Note that the coe¢ cients in the Q3 and Q4 regressions are smaller in magnitude
than that for the Q2 regression. Hence, the positive e⁄ect of Private Credit is larger in the
low-middle income quintile (Q2). Also, note that the coe¢ cient on the Growth of GDP per
capita for both Q3 and Q4 regressions is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 1.5 This means that
the increase in GDP per capita in the economy raised incomes in Q3 and Q4 one-for-one and
that Private Credit had a positive e⁄ect beyond its e⁄ect on GDP per capita.
Next, we examine the regression for the richest quintile Q5. While the growth of GDP
per capita raised the income of the rich, the evidence does not support a disproportionate
e⁄ect of ￿nancial development as the estimated coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant.
Finally, the last column of Table 3 reports the regression with the Gini coe¢ cient as the
dependent variable. The estimated coe¢ cient for Private Credit is positive and signi￿cant at
the 10% level. The positive e⁄ect indicates that ￿nancial development may have increased
inequality in LAC. Recall that the Gini coe¢ cient summarizes the whole income distribution
in one number which is not an easy task. Given that ￿nancial development appears to not
have a⁄ected the poorest and the richest quintiles, but a⁄ected the low-middle, middle, and
middle-high income groups to di⁄erent degrees, it is possible that e⁄ect of Private Credit on
the Gini yields higher inequality (or no e⁄ect if one strictly applies the standard 5% level of
signi￿cance).
We next proceed to test the Greenwood and Jovanovic hypothesis by estimating equation
(2). As described above, we created a dummy variable at several discrete intervals of the
GDP per capita distribution. We run regressions for each potential threshold. We ￿nd
evidence of a non-linear e⁄ect that seems to roughly start when the threshold is placed at
the 30th percentile of the distribution. For conciseness, we only report the results using this
30th percentile threshold; the results for other thresholds are available from the authors.
Table 4 describes these results. The regressions are estimated using two controls sets. The
￿Simple Control Set￿includes the lagged level of income (or lagged Gini for the inequality
regression) and the growth rate of GDP per capita. The ￿Full Control Set￿includes the
lagged dependent variable, the growth rate of GDP per capita, schooling attainment, the log
of in￿ ation, and trade openness. Consider ￿rst the regression for the poorest quintile (Q1).
Again there is no evidence of an e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on the income of the poor
even accounting for a potential non-linear e⁄ect. Next consider the regression for the low-
middle income quintile (Q2) shown on the third and fourth columns. Private credit does not
have a statistical signi￿cant e⁄ect when below the threshold. However, once the threshold is
passed, the e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant and positive. The estimated coe¢ cient reported
for PC +(DUM ￿PC) is basically ￿1+￿2 from equation (2) and it is 0.235, which is larger
5This is again acertained with additional t-tests not shown in Table 4.
11than its counterpart from the regression without a threshold discussed previously.
The results for Q3 and Q4 are similar. There is a positive signi￿cant e⁄ect above the
threshold as Greenwood and Jovanovic￿ s (1991) theory predicts. Below the threshold, how-
ever, we ￿nd that there is no statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect which does not agree with Green-
wood and Jovanovic (1990). However, note that the signs of the coe¢ cients are uniformly
negative as Greenwood and Jovanovic would predict.
The regression for the richest quintile Q5 again indicates no e⁄ect of ￿nancial development
on the rich as in the previous table. This is also the case for the Gini coe¢ cient which does not
support the Greenwood and Jovanovic hypothesis directly. Again, however, one must note
that since the middle quintiles appear to exhibit non-linear e⁄ects of di⁄erent magnitudes
pulling the distribution or Gini in di⁄erent directions, the non-e⁄ect on Gini may be explained
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































135 Discussion of Results and Conclusions
The expansion of ￿nancial markets has received quite a bit of attention in Latin America and
the Caribbean from governments and multilateral organizations. Larger ￿nancial systems
have been found to increase growth and reduce poverty and inequality in large world samples.
We studied the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on the distribution of income in LAC. We
￿nd that ￿nancial development has not had an e⁄ect on the incomes of the poorest quintile.
Conversely, it has a positive and disproportionate e⁄ect on the incomes of quintiles Q2, Q3,
and Q4. Given the serious concern in LAC countries with reduction of extreme poverty, it
is important to understand why ￿nancial services may not be reaching the poorest segments
of society.
The poor are likely to use micro￿nance institutions, rather than full-￿ edged commercial
banks or other ￿nancial institutions. According to Bouillon and Tejerina (2007), the e⁄ects
of micro￿nance have been mixed with a positive e⁄ect on income found in Brazil and Peru,
but a zero or negative e⁄ect found in Bolivia and Chile. These mixed results from micro-
level studies may explain why there seems to be no e⁄ect at the aggregate level as well
as in our paper. According to a World Bank study, micro￿nance institutions reach the
moderate poor, but do not reach the extremely poor (Sebastad and Cohen, 2000). Navajas
and Tejerina (2007) estimate that the average loan size of these institutions in LAC in 2005
was about $1,000, which is likely out of the question for the extremely poor. In addition, the
poor may have di¢ culty getting ￿nancing even from some microlending institutions since
many of them may require collateral to make a loan. Hernando De Soto￿ s (2000) well known
hypothesis is that lack of land titling implies that it cannot be used as collateral to borrow
from banks, so investments that may have raised the incomes of poor farmers are curtailed.
While micro-level studies of land titling programs in Argentina, Nicaragua, and Peru show
positive e⁄ects on school attendance and health, they ￿nd no e⁄ect on credit access which
was the primary purpose of these polices (Bouillon and Tejerina, 2007).
It is possible that the poor simply do not have enough access to ￿nancial services, or
that they only have access to a subset of ￿nancial services. Here we focused on a ￿nancial
size measure, but the more relevant measure for the poor may be access and use of ￿nancial
services. Unfortunately, data on this has only been recently collected and it is only available
for a recent period (see Beck, Demirg￿￿-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2006). The poor￿ s low
level of access may be also due to their location: a large share of the poor live in rural areas
where banking services have trouble reaching. Yet another possibility is that their demand
for ￿nancial services is low. Why the poor are not bene￿tting from expanded ￿nancial
services remains a question of interest for future research.
14The positive ￿ndings of the paper are that ￿nancial development seems to have succeeded
in raising the income of individuals in the middle income ranges (Q2 to Q4). This is an
encouraging ￿nding. In particular, the e⁄ect for the low-middle quintile Q2 seems to be even
larger than that in Q3 and Q4. Hence, the second poorest quintile has been able to access
￿nancial markets and bene￿t, perhaps due to living in urban areas. In summary, the e⁄orts
placed on developing ￿nancial markets to help a country prosper appear to have yielded
some positive e⁄ects. Much work remains in understanding why the poorest in LAC have
not yet bene￿tted.
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176 Appendix
Country List
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
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